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Cross-Ownership as a Structural Explanation for
Over- and Underestimation of Default Probability
Sabine Karl1 and Tom Fischer1
University of Wuerzburg
Based on the work of Suzuki [2002], we consider a generalization of Mer-
ton’s asset valuation approach [Merton, 1974] in which two firms are linked
by cross-ownership of equity and liabilities. Suzuki’s results then provide
no arbitrage prices of firm values, which are derivatives of exogenous asset
values. In contrast to the Merton model, the assumption of lognormally dis-
tributed assets does not result in lognormally distributed firm values, which
also affects the corresponding probabilities of default. In a simulation study
we see that, depending on the type of cross-ownership, the lognormal model
can lead to both, over- and underestimation of the actual probability of
default of a firm under cross-ownership. In the limit, i.e. if the levels of
cross-ownership tend to their maximum possible value, these findings can be
shown theoretically as well. Furthermore, we consider the default probability
of a firm in general, i.e. without a distributional assumption, and show that
the lognormal model is often able to yield only a limited range of probabili-
ties of default, while the actual probabilities may take any value between 0
and 1.
Keywords: counterparty risk; credit risk; cross-ownership; firm valuation; heavy tails;
structural model.
1. Introduction
Published in 1974, Merton’s model of asset valuation revolutionized academic finance
as well as the practice of both asset valuation and credit risk management. Since then,
many refinements and extensions have been made (an overview may be found in a paper
by Bohn [2000]), but the crucial insight that the value of a firm’s equity can be regarded
as a European call option on the firm’s asset value with strike price equal to the firm’s
debt, if the firm’s financial structure is sufficiently simple, is still inherent to all these
subsequent versions. Merton’s approach not only provides an intuitive and tractable
framework to value a firm’s equity and debt, it also laid the foundation to a wide class
of credit risk models. As these models are characterized by the consideration of the
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firm’s financial structure in order to derive the probabilities of default, they are com-
monly referred to as “structural models”. However, in their basic form, such models are
applicable to a single firm only, and hence unable to explain the fact that credit events of
firms do not occur independently of each other, as becomes evident in the work of Lucas
[1995]. Within structural models, one of the first approaches of taking this finding into
account was to consider correlated asset values, which is for example described by Zhou
[2001]. According to Giesecke [2004], however, the consideration of asset correlations
only explains what he calls “cyclical default correlation” originating from the fact that
firms are subject to common macroeconomic factors. In contrast to that, correlation
caused by what he calls “credit contagion” is not captured. Credit contagion arises from
“direct ties between firms”, as an example he describes the situation where one firm has
given a trade credit to the other firm. Although Giesecke [2004] writes that “[i]t is easy
to imagine that [...] economic distress of one firm can have an immediate adverse effect
on the financial health of that firm’s business partners”, this connection enters his model
only indirectly by an incomplete information approach. Also Lucas [1995] acknowledges
the possibility that “default correlation is caused if one firm is a creditor of another”.
Although there are numerous articles on counterparty risk and financial contagion, see
Jarrow and Turnbull [1995] and Duffie and Huang [1996] and references therein, current
credit risk models (an overview is provided by Crouhy et al. [2000]) apparently do not
take this fact into account explicitly, i.e. on a structural level and in a multi-lateral way.
One reason for this might be that only in the last decade models of asset valuation came
to existence that directly include such relationships.
While Merton’s model served as the basis for credit risk models for a single firm, the
works of Eisenberg and Noe [2001], Suzuki [2002], Elsinger [2007] and Fischer [2012] can
be used to consider individual and joint probabilities of default by direct incorporation
of systemic risk caused by the structure of the firms’ relations between each other. Fi-
nancial claims and obligations as described above can be subsumed under the general
term of cross-ownership, which means that in a system of firms, these firms are linked
to each other in that every firm’s balance sheet contains financial assets or liabilities,
no matter if short-term or long-term, issued by other firms in the system. In partic-
ular, Eisenberg and Noe [2001], Suzuki [2002], Elsinger [2007] and Fischer [2012] are
all concerned with the problem of how to value such firms and any of their liabilities
linked to each other by either cross-ownership of equity and debt, or both. Under cross-
ownership, credit contagion may not only occur unidirectional, but if a chain reaction
forces an initially healthy firm to default, this event might revert to the triggering firm,
causing its financial situation to deteriorate even further, “potentially a financial vicious
circle” [Fischer, 2012]. In Fischer [2012], a rather general setup of cross-ownership be-
tween n firms having m liabilities is considered, which can include debt and derivatives,
of differing seniority. The main result consists of an existence and uniqueness theorem
of no-arbitrage prices of equity and liabilities, which can be computed by a fixed point
iteration. The framework of Suzuki [2002] can be seen as a special case of Fischer [2012],
since he examines the situation of n firms having a single, homogeneous class of zero-
coupon debt only. Thus, the work of Suzuki [2002] directly extends Merton’s ideas to
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the case of two or more firms linked by cross-ownership. However, this approach has not
yet been widely accepted or incorporated as a standard in asset valuation or credit risk
management.
From both, an academic and practical point of view, the question arises to what extent
this neglect of cross-ownership between firms can affect the resulting firm values and
estimated probabilities of default. Recall that Merton [1974] starts from a single class
of exogenous assets following a geometric Brownian motion, which means that asset
values are lognormally distributed at maturity. Under cross-ownership, however, the
assets of a firm do not only consist of exogenous assets, but also of endogenous assets
stemming from cross-ownership, for instance shares or bonds issued by another firm. It
can be shown that firm values under cross-ownership, i.e. the total assets of a firm, are
non-trivial derivatives of exogenous asset values (see Suzuki [2002] and Fischer [2012],
for example). Hence, firm values are generally not lognormally distributed anymore, in
contrast to Merton’s model. Returning to the problem of determining probabilities of
default, the assumption of generally lognormally distributed firm values when exogenous
assets follow a lognormal distribution can furthermore lead to incorrect probabilities of
default, whether for the single firms or joint probabilities of default.
Our work can be seen as a direct continuation of the work of Suzuki [2002] for two firms,
since we also consider cross-ownership scenarios with two firms having a single class of
zero-coupon debt only. Based on Suzuki’s formulas of equity and debt prices, we will first
be concerned with the resulting firm values and probabilities of default. More precisely,
we examine the consequences of applying Merton’s model of firm valuation to each firm
separately, i.e. without consideration of cross-ownership. Unfortunately, it seems to be
impossible to obtain a closed-form solution of the distribution of firm values (and hence
exact probabilities of default) under cross-ownership. Thus, we conduct a simulation
study (cf. Section 3) that compares the probabilities of default resulting from Suzuki’s
model and from the lognormal distribution, the distribution of firm values resulting from
Merton’s approach. In Section 4, we provide a theoretical analysis of these probabilities
in the limit, which means that we let the degree of cross-ownership converge to its
maximum value. In this case, the distribution of firm values can be derived analytically,
and the mathematical results match our empirical findings. In Section 5, we abandon
any distributional assumptions with respect to exogenous asset values and analyze the
probabilities of default under a rather general setup. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our
results and mentions some possible extensions.
2. Firm Valuation with and without Cross-Ownership
2.1. Merton’s model
In Merton’s asset valuation model [Merton, 1974], a single firm is assumed to have one
class of exogenously priced assets a and a certain amount of zero-coupon debt d due at
some future time T . In this context, “exogenously” means that the value is independent
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Assets Liab.
a s
r
Table 1: Single Firm: Balance sheet at maturity
of the firm’s capital structure. At maturity, debt has to be paid back, but if the asset
value has fallen below the face value of debt at this time, the firm is said to be in default
and all assets are handed over to the creditor. Thus, the creditor receives the minimum
of d and a, which we call the recovery value of debt, r. The value of equity, s, then is
the value of the remaining assets, so, at maturity:
r = min{d, a} = recovery value of debt, (1)
s = (a− d)+ = value of equity. (2)
The firm’s balance sheet at maturity is given in Table 1. Based on this balance sheet,
we make the following definition.
Definition 1. Based on (1) and (2), we define the firm value v of a firm as the firm’s
total asset value:
v := r + s = a.
A generalization of this firm value to the case of two firms linked by cross-ownership is
derived in the next section.
2.2. Suzuki’s model
2.2.1. Cross-Ownership Fractions and Types of Cross-Ownership
Let us now consider two firms linked by cross-ownership (“XOS”). Then the assets of
each firm do not only consist of an exogenous asset a, but also of financial assets issued
by the other firm, for example in form of bonds or shares. As in the case of a single firm,
we assume each firm to have a certain amount of zero-coupon debt with face value d1
and d2, respectively. Let si and ri denote the no-arbitrage prices of equity and recovery
value of debt of firm i, i = 1, 2. Then the value of a firm’s assets originating from
cross-ownership can be written as
M sij · sj︸ ︷︷ ︸
cross-owned equity
+ Mdij · rj,︸ ︷︷ ︸
cross-owned debt
where M sij and M
d
ij stand for the fraction that firm i owns of firm j’s equity and debt,
respectively. Note that the value of cross-owned debt is a fraction of the other firm’s
recovery value of debt, and not its face value of debt.
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In general, the so-called cross-ownership fractions M sij and M
d
ij (i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2; i 6= j)
can take values in the interval [0, 1]. Based on their exact value, we define three types
of cross-ownership.
Definition 2. The two firms are said to be linked by
1. cross-ownership of equity only, if
M s1,2 > 0, M
s
2,1 > 0, M
d
1,2 =M
d
2,1 = 0,
that is each firm holds a part of the other firm’s equity, but none of its debt;
2. cross-ownership of debt only, if
M s1,2 =M
s
2,1 = 0, M
d
1,2 > 0, M
d
2,1 > 0,
that is each firm holds a part of the other firm’s debt, but none of its equity;
3. simultaneous cross-ownership of equity and debt, if
min{M s1,2,M s2,1,Md1,2,Md2,1} > 0,
that is each firm holds a part of both the other firm’s equity and debt.
Remark 1. The definition of cross-ownership of both equity and debt (type 3) could be
extended to scenarios where exactly one of the four cross-ownership fractions equals 0,
or where firm 1 holds a part of firm 2’s equity and firm 2 holds a part of firm 1’s debt,
or vice versa, i.e.
min{M s1,2, Md2,1} > 0, M s2,1 = Md1,2 = 0,
or
M s1,2 =M
d
2,1 = 0, min{M s2,1, Md1,2} > 0.
In order to avoid case differentiations, we prefer Definition 23.
Note that our definition of cross-ownership would not impose any restrictions with re-
spect to the type of debt that is cross-owned. For example, a firm could hold a derivative
on any underlying considered in the model, e.g. exogenous assets. However, following
Suzuki [2002], we will assume all liabilities to be zero-coupon-bonds with identical ma-
turity.
Furthermore, we will assume that no firm’s equity or debt is completely owned by the
other firm, but that some part of the equity and debt is held by a firm or investor outside
of the system of the two firms. For the cross-ownership fractions, this implies that
max{M s1,2,M s2,1,Md1,2,Md2,1} < 1.
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Firm 1
Assets Liab.
a1 s1
M s1,2 × s2 r1
Md1,2 × r2
Firm 2
Assets Liab.
a2 s2
M s2,1 × s1 r2
Md2,1 × r1
Table 2: Two firms under XOS: Balance sheets at maturity
Furthermore, we suppose that no firm holds a part of its own equity or debt.
The firms’ balance sheets at maturity under cross-ownership are given in Table 2. It
is now clear that the value of firm 1 also depends on the financial health of firm 2: if
firm 2 defaults, this will affect both, the value of its equity and the recovery value of
its debt, which will possibly be smaller than the actual outstanding amount. Therefore,
the total asset value of firm 1 will decrease and thus firm 1 might also get into trouble,
which again might affect firm 2 in a negative way. If we applied Merton’s model of firm
valuation to each firms separately in order to obtain no-arbitrage prices of equity and
debt, we would ignore this circular dependence between the two firms. The work of
Suzuki [2002] shows how to overcome this problem by applying Merton’s idea to both
firms simultaneously.
2.2.2. Suzuki’s equations
It is clear from Table 2 that the total assets of firm i consist of an exogenous and an
endogenous part:
a∗i := ai︸︷︷︸
exogenous
assets
+M sij sj +M
d
ijrj︸ ︷︷ ︸
endogenous
assets
≥ 0, i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2; i 6= j,
where “endogenous” means that the price is determined within the system of the two
firms.
If we now apply Merton’s approach to both firms simultaneously, we obtain in analogy
to (1) and (2) the following system of equations:
ri = min{di, a∗i } = min{di, ai +M sij sj +Mdijrj}, (3)
si = (a
∗
i − di)+ = (ai +M sij sj +Mdijrj − di)+, (4)
with i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2; i 6= j.
As before, the recovery value of debt of a firm still is the minimum of the firm’s liability
and total asset value, but under cross-ownership this recovery value now also depends
on the other firm’s equity value and recovery value of debt. Similarly, the value of equity
at maturity is now influenced by the other firm’s equity and recovery value of debt. The
6
recovery value of debt (as part of a solution of (3) and (4)) and the total asset value a∗i
of a firm are always non-negative. A proof can be found in Fischer [2012].
Suzuki [2002] solves this system of four non-linear equations with four unknowns. The
resulting explicit formulas for ri and si are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The system (3)–(4) is solved by
r1 =

d1, (a1, a2) ∈ Ass,
d1, (a1, a2) ∈ Asd,
1
1−Ms
1,2M
d
2,1
(a1 +M
s
1,2a2 + (M
d
1,2 −M s1,2)d2), (a1, a2) ∈ Ads,
1
1−Md
1,2M
d
2,1
(a1 +M
d
1,2a2), (a1, a2) ∈ Add,
r2 =

d2, (a1, a2) ∈ Ass,
1
1−Ms
2,1M
d
1,2
(M s2,1a1 + a2 + (M
d
2,1 −M s2,1)d1), (a1, a2) ∈ Asd,
d2, (a1, a2) ∈ Ads,
1
1−Md
1,2M
d
2,1
(Md2,1a1 + a2), (a1, a2) ∈ Add,
s1 =

1
1−Ms
1,2
Ms
2,1
(a1 +M
s
1,2a2 + (M
s
1,2M
d
2,1 − 1)d1 + (Md1,2 −M s1,2)d2, (a1, a2) ∈ Ass,
1
1−Ms
2,1M
d
1,2
(a1 +M
d
1,2a2 + (M
d
1,2M
d
2,1 − 1)d1), (a1, a2) ∈ Asd,
0, (a1, a2) ∈ Ads,
0, (a1, a2) ∈ Add,
s2 =

1
1−Ms
1,2
Ms
2,1
(M s1,2a1 + a2 + (M
d
2,1 −M s2,1)d1 + (M s2,1Md1,2 − 1)d2, (a1, a2) ∈ Ass,
0, (a1, a2) ∈ Asd,
1
1−Ms
2,1
Md
2,1
(Md2,1a1 + a2 + (M
d
1,2M
d
2,1 − 1)d2), (a1, a2) ∈ Ads,
0, (a1, a2) ∈ Add,
with (what we call “Suzuki areas”)
Ass = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 +M s1,2a2 ≥ (1−M s1,2Md2,1)d1 + (M s1,2 −Md1,2)d2,
M s2,1a1 + a2 ≥ (M s2,1 −Md2,1)d1 + (1−M s2,1Md1,2)d2}, (5)
Asd = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 +Md1,2a2 ≥ (1−Md1,2Md2,1)d1,
M s2,1a1 + a2 < (M
s
2,1 −Md2,1)d1 + (1−M s2,1Md1,2)d2}, (6)
Ads = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 +M s1,2a2 < (1−M s1,2Md2,1)d1 + (M s1,2 −Md1,2)d2,
Md2,1a1 + a2 ≥ (1−Md1,2Md2,1)d2}, (7)
Add = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 +Md1,2a2 < (1−Md1,2Md2,1)d1,
Md2,1a1 + a2 < (1−Md1,2Md2,1)d2}. (8)
The exact derivation with proof may be found in Suzuki [2002]. Note that these formulas
also hold for the extended definition of cross-ownership of both equity and debt given
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in Remark 1.
Obviously, ri ≤ di and si ≥ 0. According to Lemma 1, the functions ri(a1, a2) and
si(a1, a2) are section-wise defined, where the four sections on R
+
0 ×R+0 indicate if any of
the two firms is in default or not:
By definition, firm i (i=1,2) is in default if its assets do not suffice to pay back all of
its debt, i.e. if a∗i < di. Equations (3) and (4) imply a
∗
i = si + ri, and straightforward
calculation yields
firm 1 in default ⇔ a∗1 < d1 ⇔ r1 < d1 ⇔ (a1, a2) ∈ Ads ∪ Add,
firm 2 in default ⇔ a∗2 < d2 ⇔ r2 < d2 ⇔ (a1, a2) ∈ Asd ∪ Add.
(9)
This clarifies how to understand the notation Ac1,c2. If the exogenous asset value (a1, a2)
has fallen into a certain area Ac1,c2, firm i’s condition is indicated by ci ∈ {s, d}, where
“s” stands for “solvent” and “d” for “default”.
Remark 2. Let r := (r1, r2)
T, s := (s1, s2)
T and d = (d1, d2)
T. Then (3) and (4) can be
written as
r = min{d, a+Mdr+Mss}, (10)
s = (a+Mdr+Mss− d)+, (11)
where a = (a1, a2)
T and
Ms =
(
0 M s1,2
M s2,1 0
)
, Md =
(
0 Md1,2
Md2,1 0
)
,
and it follows that
a+Mdr+Mss = r+ s. (12)
A generalization of (10), (11) and (12) to the case of n firms withm outstanding liabilities
each, can be found in Elsinger [2007] and Fischer [2012].
2.2.3. Firm value under Cross-Ownership
It can be shown that ri and si given in Lemma 1 are continuous functions of a1 and
a2. Thus, the recovery value of debt and the value of equity under cross-ownership are
derivatives of exogenous asset values:
ri = ri(a1, a2), si = si(a1, a2), (13)
just as in the Merton model.
In the Merton model for a single firm, we defined the firm value v as the sum of equity
value and recovery value of debt (cf. Definition 1). Definition 3 transfers this definition
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to the case of cross-ownership.
Definition 3. Using the notation of Lemma 1, the firm value vi of firm i under cross-
ownership equals the firm’s total asset value, i.e.
vi : = ai +M
s
ij sj +M
d
ijrj .
From (3), (4) and (13) we obtain
vi = vi(ai, aj) = ai +M
s
ij sj(ai, aj) +M
d
ijrj(ai, aj)
= si(ai, aj) + ri(ai, aj), (14)
which means that the firm value is also a derivative of exogenous asset values, and
Lemma 1 yields
v1 =

1
1−Ms
1,2M
s
2,1
(a1 +M
s
1,2a2 +M
s
1,2(M
d
2,1 −M s2,1)d1 + (Md1,2 −M s1,2)d2), (a1, a2) ∈ Ass,
1
1−Ms
2,1M
d
1,2
(a1 +M
d
1,2a2 +M
d
1,2(M
d
2,1 −M s2,1)d1), (a1, a2) ∈ Asd,
1
1−Ms
1,2
Md
2,1
(a1 +M
s
1,2a2 + (M
d
1,2 −M s1,2)d2), (a1, a2) ∈ Ads,
1
1−Md
1,2M
d
2,1
(a1 +M
d
1,2a2), (a1, a2) ∈ Add,
(15)
v2 =

1
1−Ms
1,2M
s
2,1
(M s2,1a1 + a2 + (M
d
2,1 −M s2,1)d1 +M s2,1(Md1,2 −M s1,2)d2), (a1, a2) ∈ Ass,
1
1−Ms
2,1M
d
1,2
(M s2,1a1 + a2 + (M
d
2,1 −M s2,1)d1), (a1, a2) ∈ Asd,
1
1−Ms
1,2M
d
2,1
(Md2,1a1 + a2 +M
d
2,1(M
d
1,2 −M s1,2)d2), (a1, a2) ∈ Ads,
1
1−Md
1,2M
d
2,1
(Md2,1a1 + a2), (a1, a2) ∈ Add.
(16)
Furthermore, (9) and (14) imply
v1 < d1 ⇔ (a1, a2) ∈ Ads ∪ Add,
v2 < d2 ⇔ (a1, a2) ∈ Asd ∪ Add,
(17)
which yields a more intuitive representation of the Suzuki areas than the one given in
(5) – (8):
Ass = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : v1 ≥ d1, v2 ≥ d2},
Asd = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : v1 ≥ d1, v2 < d2},
Ads = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : v1 < d1, v2 ≥ d2},
Add = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : v1 < d1, v2 < d2}.
(18)
An example of the Suzuki areas is given in Figure 1. Note that if d1 ≤ Md1,2d2 and/or
d2 ≤Md2,1d1, the areas Ads and/or Asd vanish.
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a1
a2
d1 −Md1,2d2
d2 −Md2,1d1
0
Ass
Add
Asd
Ads
Figure 1: Suzuki areas if d1 > M
d
1,2d2 and d2 > M
d
2,1d1
If the two firms have established cross-ownership of either equity or debt, the formula of
v1 given in (15) can be simplified. Under cross-ownership of equity only, (15) reduces to
vs1 :=

1
1−Ms
1,2
Ms
2,1
(a1 +M
s
1,2a2 −M s1,2M s2,1d1 −M s1,2d2), (a1, a2) ∈ Ass,
a1, (a1, a2) ∈ Asd ∪ Add,
a1 +M
s
1,2a2 −M s1,2d2, (a1, a2) ∈ Ads.
(19)
As we can see, vs1 is a kind of section-wise defined linear combination of exogenous asset
values a1 and a2 and face values of liabilities d1 and d2. Note that the coefficients of the
liabilities are always non-positive.
Under cross-ownership of debt only, the value of firm 1 is given by
vd1 :=

a1 +M
d
1,2d2, (a1, a2) ∈ Ass ∪Ads,
a1 +M
d
1,2a2 +M
d
1,2M
d
2,1d1, (a1, a2) ∈ Asd,
1
1−Md
1,2M
d
2,1
(a1 +M
d
1,2a2), (a1, a2) ∈ Add.
(20)
Similar to vs1, v
d
1 is also a weighted sum of exogenous asset values, but in contrast to the
case of cross-ownership of equity only in (19), the face values of debt of both firms now
contribute with a non-negative sign.
By setting M s1,2 = M
s
2,1 = 0 in (16), one could also obtain formulas for v
s
2 and v
d
2 , the
value of firm 2 under cross-ownership of equity only and cross-ownership of debt only,
respectively.
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2.3. Calculation of probabilities of default
In the previous section, we saw that the firm value is a function of the exogenous asset
values. In the following, we will assume these exogenous asset values to be stochastic,
which also turns the firm value v into a random variable, because it is a continuous
function of asset values. This is why we will denote asset values and firm values with
capital As and V s, respectively, in the remainder.
We will assume exogenous assets to follow a bivariate geometric Brownian motion, sim-
ilar to often extensions of the Merton model to the multivariate case. Thus, we have
lognormally distributed exogenous asset values A1, A2 at maturity. We do not make any
restrictions with respect to the correlation between A1 and A2.
Since the firm value equals the sum of exogenous and endogenous assets (cf. Definition
3), a firm is in default if and only if its firm value is smaller than the face value of its
liabilities. Hence,
P (firm i in default) = P (Vi < di). (21)
Without cross-ownership, the assumption of lognormally distributed asset values would
imply that firm values are also lognormally distributed because of Vi = Ai in this sit-
uation (cf. Definition 1), i.e. the evaluation of (21) would be straightforward. But
as we have seen in (15) and (16), firm values are non-trivial derivatives of exogenous
asset values under cross-ownership. Consequently, the distribution of firm values is a
transformation of the lognormal distribution, which is generally not lognormal anymore.
However, we are not able to derive a closed-form solution of the resulting distribution,
because, alongside other problems, there is no convolution theorem for lognormal distri-
butions.
In this situation, one could ask to what extent the probability of default of firm i given
in (21) depends on whether the actual distribution of Vi under cross-ownership or the
lognormal distribution is used. Or expressed differently: what mistake (with respect to
the resulting probabilities of default) do we make if we ignore that a part of the assets
is priced endogenously, and treat all assets as a single, homogeneous class of exogenous
assets following a lognormal distribution which has the same first two moments as the
actual firm value under cross-ownership? Since this approach would result in lognormally
distributed firm values, this question essentially aims at the effects of applying Merton’s
model of firm valuation to both firms separately, despite the presence of cross-ownership.
In the remainder, we will be concerned with the comparison of probabilities of default
obtained under both models.
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3. Simulation Study of Default Probabilities under
Cross-Ownership
3.1. Setup and Parameter Values
In order to get a first impression, we did a short simulation study for cross-ownership
of equity only and cross-ownership of debt only (cf. Definition 2) with the following
parameters.
Exogenous assets of the two firms are independent and lognormally distributed at ma-
turity T = 1:
(A1, A2) ∼ LN (µ,Σ) (22)
with µ = (µ, µ)T = (−0.5σ2 + ln(a),−0.5σ2 + ln(a)), a > 0, and Σ = ( σ2 0
0 σ2
)
. This
implies
E(Ai) = exp(−0.5σ2 + ln(a) + 0.5σ2) = a,
Var(Ai) = exp(−σ2 + 2 ln(a) + σ2)(exp(σ2)− 1) = a2(exp(σ2)− 1), i = 1, 2.
The coefficient of variation2 of Ai (i = 1, 2) is given through
√
exp(σ2)− 1.
Furthermore, the liabilities of the two firms have identical face values d1 = d2 =: d.
Because of this kind of symmetry between the two firms, the main part of our study
only analyzes probabilities of default of firm 1. Note that any two setups for which the
ratio d/a is identical can be interpreted as the same setup under a different currency at
a constant exchange rate. Thus, only the relative size of d to a is important, but not
their absolute sizes. This is why we set a = 1 in all our simulations and let only d take
different values. In particular, we have E(Ai) = 1 and Var(Ai) = exp(σ
2)− 1, i = 1, 2.
In our simulation study of default probabilities, we considered all possible combinations
of (M s1,2,M
s
2,1) with M
s
1,2,M
s
2,1 ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9}. Likewise for V d1 and (Md1,2,Md2,1).
The value of the liabilities, d, ran through {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 2.9, 3}, which means that
debt
expected ex. assets
=
d
a
∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 2.9, 3}.
The variance of logarithmized exogenous assets σ2 (cf. (22)) took values in {0.00995,
0.22314, 0.44629, 0.69315, 1, 1.17865, 1.60944, 1.98100, 2.30259, 3.25810, 4.04743,
4.61512}, which approximately resulted in coefficients of variation of Ai of {0.1, 0.5,
0.75, 1, 1.31, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 5, 7.5, 10}.
For every combination of parameters and both types of cross-ownership, 10,000 values of
(A1, A2) were simulated. Based on (17), the probability of default under Suzuki’s model
2For a random variable X with mean µ and standard deviation σ, the coefficient of variation is defined
as σ
µ
.
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was estimated by
pˆS :=
#{(A1, A2) ∈ Ads ∪ Add}
10, 000
. (23)
The same simulated values of (A1, A2) were used to calculate values for V1, and from that
an empirical distribution function FˆXOS of V1. In order to determine the correspond-
ing probability of default under the lognormal model, we approximated FˆXOS with a
lognormal distribution. The parameters of this lognormal distribution were determined
in analogy to the Fenton–Wilkinson method [Fenton, 1960] of moment matching, which
means that the first and second moments ofW were chosen such that they corresponded
to the estimated first and second moments of V1.
By (23), pˆS was estimated with four decimal places only. For a better comparison, we
rounded the probabilities of default obtained from the lognormal model to four decimal
places as well. These values will be denoted by pˆL. As a measure for the discrepancy
between the two models we used the relative risk RR of the two models, estimated by
R̂R :=

pˆL
pˆS
, pˆS > 0,
1, pˆS = 0 and pˆL = 0,
∞, pˆS = 0 and pˆL > 0.
The results of our simulation study are presented in the subsequent section.
3.2. Results
First, we saw for both, cross-ownership of equity only and cross-ownership of debt only,
that if the level of liabilities is chosen very small compared to σ2, both models yield
(rounded) estimated default probabilities of 0, and the estimated relative risk ratios R̂R
equal 1. If d/a is chosen very large compared to σ2, we observe a similar effect, with the
difference that now both models yield (rounded) estimated probabilities of default of 1.
However, note that the theoretical probabilities of default under either model can never
take a value of exactly 0 or exactly 1, since we assume exogenous assets to follow a
(continuous) lognormal distribution. Hence, also if d/a is chosen very large or small, the
theoretical risk ratio is probably different from 1, but our short simulations cannot reveal
whether we have to expect the lognormal model to over- or underestimate the actual
risk in such scenarios. For very high levels of cross-ownership, the results of Section 4
will offer more insight.
When d/a was chosen such that both (rounded) estimated probabilities of default were
likely to lie in the open interval (0, 1), it seemed that with increasing σ2, the range of
such values of d/a became wider. In surface plots we observed the following effects with
respect to the cross-ownership fractions.
Under cross-ownership of equity only, we saw that, roughly speaking, the higher the
cross-ownership fractions, the smaller the obtained values of R̂R. These values tended
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Figure 2: Estimated rounded relative risk R̂R in dependency of XOS-fractions (n =
10, 000); (a) XOS of equity only, σ2 = 0.22314, d/a = 0.7; (b) XOS of debt
only, σ2 = 1.60944, d/a=0.4
to be bigger than 1 or about 1 if M s1,2 was small. For M
s
1,2 and M
s
2,1 close to 1, we
observed relative risks close to 0, i.e. the lognormal model then underestimates the
actual probability of default. An example is given in Figure 2(a), where the smallest
value of R̂R was 0.1779. For smaller values of d/a we even obtained estimated relative
risks of 0.
Under cross-ownership of debt, we observed opposite effects. Here, the values of R̂R
were non-decreasing in the considered levels of cross-ownership, see Figure 2(b) for an
example. For scenarios with high levels of cross-ownership (and d/a chosen appropriately
in the sense explained earlier) we always obtained risk ratios greater than 1, i.e. the
lognormal now overestimates the actual probability of default in these scenarios.
As should have been expected, the difference between the two types of cross-ownership
(in terms of the obtained risk ratios) especially becomes clear for scenarios with a high
level of cross-ownership. Hence, we fixed the cross-ownership fractions to 0.95 and had
a closer look at the corresponding probabilities of default in a further short simulation
study. Exogenous asset values were lognormally distributed with a = 1 and σ2 = 1 (cf.
(22)), liabilities d took values between 0.1 and 10 with steps of 0.1. Every combination
of parameters was repeated 100,000 times to obtain estimated probabilities of default
(rounded to five decimal places now). The results for cross-ownership of equity only
were such that the estimated relative risk was strictly smaller than 1 for any considered
level of liabilities, whereas we always had estimated relative risks strictly greater than 1
under cross-ownership of debt only.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: Probabilities of default, solid line: empirical distribution function of firm val-
ues V1 resulting from Suzuki’s model (n = 100, 000 iterations), dotted line:
matched lognormal distribution; (a) XOS of equity only, σ2 = 1, d/a = 0.9;
(b) XOS of debt only, σ2 = 1, d/a = 1.6.
Two examples can be found in Figure 3. Note that the values of d (0.9 and 1.6, resp.)
were chosen such that the absolute difference between the estimated (rounded) proba-
bilities of default was maximized. The estimated (rounded) probabilities under Suzuki’s
model and the lognormal model are 0.51857 and 0.17464 in Figure 3(a), and 0.02185
and 0.25530 in Figure 3(b). The corresponding relative risks R̂R amount to 0.33677 and
11.684.
The insights gained in our simulations laid the foundation for the theoretical analyses in
the subsequent sections. In particular, we will be concerned with probabilities of default
of a firm under various assumptions.
4. Limiting Probability of Default
In our simulations we saw that if the two firms have established a high level of cross-
ownership, the two types of cross-ownership seem to have opposite effects on the prob-
abilities of default obtained under the lognormal model, compared to Suzuki’s model.
Unfortunately, we cannot compute the exact values under either model, because we can
determine neither the distribution of V1, nor its first and second moments in closed form.
Hence, we cannot justify our findings theoretically.
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However, the situation becomes tractable, if we let the cross-ownership fractions con-
verge to 1. In this case, both the definition of the Suzuki areas given in (5)–(8) and
the formula of V1 simplify, which makes an analytical approach possible. In this section,
we will consider the “limiting” probability of default of firm 1 resulting from both, the
Suzuki model and the corresponding matching lognormal model. This will be done sep-
arately for cross-ownership of equity only and of debt only.
As in our simulations, we assume that exogenous assets are lognormally distributed, i.e.
(A1, A2) ∼ LN (µ,Σ) (24)
with µ = (µ1, µ2)
T and Σ =
( σ2
1
σ12
σ12 σ
2
2
)
. In particular, we have A1, A2 > 0. Note that
we do not impose any restrictions on µ and Σ. Since we are only concerned with the
default risk of firm 1, we set
µ := µ1, σ := σ1.
In contrast to our simulations, we do not confine ourselves to the case of d1 = d2. We
only assume d1, d2 > 0 in order to exclude degenerate cases.
4.1. XOS of equity only
Let the firm value of firm 1 under cross-ownership of equity only, V s1 , be given by (19).
If we consider the limit of M s1,2 and M
s
2,1 to 1, we are faced with the problem that for
any given (a1, a2) ∈ Ass
V s1
∣∣
Ass
=
1
1−M s1,2M s2,1
(a1 +M
s
1,2a2 −M s1,2M s2,1d1 −M s1,2d2)→∞ for M s1,2, M s2,1 → 1,
since the limit of the term in brackets is always strictly positive, because on Ass (where,
by definition, M s1,2 and M
s
2,1 are strictly smaller than 1) it holds that a1 + a2 > d1 + d2
(cf. (5)).
Thus, if we want to evaluate the limiting probability of default under both models,
this cannot be done by considering the pointwise limit of V1 and the resulting limiting
distribution. Instead, we will first calculate the probabilities of default under both
models for M s1,2,M
s
2,1 < 1 and then consider the limits of these probabilities if cross-
ownership fractions converge to 1.
Since firm 1 is in default if and only if its firm value is smaller than the face value of its
debt at maturity, we have under Suzuki’s model by (18)
P (V s1 < d1) = P (Ads ∪Add)
= P
( {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 < d1, a2 < d2 + 1Ms
1,2
(d1 − a1)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Ad.(M
s
1,2)
)
,
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where the second equality follows from (7) and (8) and Md1,2 = M
d
2,1 = 0. With M
s
1,2
increasing, the set Ad.(M
s
1,2) becomes smaller, and it follows from the continuity of a
probability measure that if M s1,2 → 1,
P (V s1 < d1)→ P ({(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 < d1, a1 + a2 ≤ d1 + d2}) > 0, (25)
where the strict positivity follows from the assumption that d1, d2 > 0.
Let now
V˜ s1 ∼ LN (µ˜, σ˜2), (26)
where µ˜ and σ˜2 are determined such that E(V˜ s1 ) = E(V
s
1 ) and Var(V˜
s
1) = Var(V
s
1). Note
that the square-integrability of V s1 follows from the square-integrability of A1 and A2.
This definition of V˜ s1 corresponds to the moment matching procedure applied in our
simulations.
Under the lognormal model, the probability of default of firm 1 equals
P (V˜ s1 < d1) = P (V˜
s
1 ≤ d1) = Φ
(
ln(d1)− µ˜
σ˜
)
,
where Φ stands for the standard normal distribution function. If the cross-ownership
fractions of equity converge to 1, this affects both, expectation and variance of V s1 and
thus also the parameters of V˜ s1 , because
µ˜ =
1
2
ln
(
E(V s1 )
4
Var(Vs1) + E(V
s
1)
2
)
, (27)
σ˜ = ln
(
Var(Vs1)
E(V s1 )
2
+ 1
)0.5
. (28)
More specifically, we have µ˜ → ∞ for M s1,2,M s2,1 → 1, and limMs1,2,Ms2,1→1 σ˜ < ∞ by
Lemma A1 in the Appendix, i.e.
ln(d1)− µ˜
σ˜
→ −∞
and thus
P (V˜ s1 < d1) = Φ
(
ln(d1)− µ˜
σ˜
)
→ 0, M s1,2, M s2,1 → 1. (29)
Comparing (25) and (29), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under cross-ownership of equity only with lognormally distributed ex-
ogenous asset values, the lognormal model underestimates the actual limiting default
probability of a firm, i.e.
lim
Ms
1,2,M
s
2,1→1
P (V s1 < d1) > lim
Ms
1,2,M
s
2,1→1
P (V˜ s1 < d1) = 0.
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In our simulation study, this was already evident for cross-ownership fractions of 0.95
(cf. Section 3.2).
Remark 3. Note that all the results obtained in this section also hold without the assump-
tion of lognormally distributed exogenous assets made in (24), if we still approximate
the distribution of V s1 with a lognormal distribution. We only have to require the dis-
tribution of exogenous assets to be continuous, non-negative, square-integrable and to
yield a strictly positive limiting probability of default P ({(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 < d1, a1+a2 ≤
d1+ d2}), and both, a strictly positive expectation and variance of A1+A2− d1− d2 on
A∗ss (cf. Lemma A2 in the Appendix), i.e. E([A1 + A2 − d1 − d2] · 1{A1+A2≥d1+d2}) > 0
and Var([A1 + A2 − d1 − d2] · 1{A1+A2≥d1+d2}) > 0 (cf. the proof of Lemma A1 in the
Appendix).
4.2. XOS of debt only
Under cross-ownership of debt only, firm values remain finite with probability 1 even if
cross-ownership fractions converge to 1. Thus, we can determine the limit of V d1 and
compare the resulting probabilities of default under both models. Recall that we assume
exogenous assets to follow a lognormal distribution given by (24).
Based on (20) we can write
V d1 =1Ass(A1, A2) ·
(
A1 +M
d
1,2d2
)
+ 1Asd(A1, A2) ·
(
A1 +M
d
1,2A2 +M
d
1,2M
d
2,1d1
)
+ 1Ads(A1, A2) ·
(
A1 +M
d
1,2d2
)
+ 1Add(A1, A2) ·
(
1
1−Md1,2Md2,1
(A1 +M
d
1,2A2)
)
,
(30)
where 1A stands for the indicator function of a set A. For the determination of the
pointwise limit of V d1 if M
d
1,2,M
d
2,1 converge to 1, we first consider the limits of the
indicator functions in (30). By Lemma A3 in the Appendix, their pointwise limits exist
and we set
lim
Md
1,2,M
d
2,1→1
1Aij =: 1A∗ij , ij ∈ {ss, sd, ds, dd} (31)
with A∗dd = {(0, 0)} by Lemma A4 in the Appendix. Hence, P (A∗dd) = 0 and
V d
∗
1 := lim
Md
1,2,M
d
2,1→1
V d1 = 1A∗ss(A1, A2) · (A1 + d2)
+ 1A∗
sd
(A1, A2) · (A1 + A2 + d1) (32)
+ 1A∗
ds
(A1, A2) · (A1 + d2) P − a.s.
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Since almost sure convergence implies convergence in distribution, we have
lim
Md
1,2
,Md
2,1
→1
P (V d1 < d1) = P (V
d∗
1 < d1).
In order to determine the latter probability of default, we have to distinguish between
the following three cases.
4.2.1. d1 = d2
For d1 = d2 it follows from (32) and Lemma A4 in the Appendix that V
d∗
1 = A1 + d2
P−a.s. Hence, V d∗1 follows a shifted lognormal distribution Λµ,σ2,λ with shift parameter
λ = d2, which means that ln(V
d∗
1 −d2) ∼ N (µ, σ2), and we obtain for the actual limiting
probability of default that
P (V d
∗
1 < d1) = P (V
d∗
1 < d2) = 0.
If we now match an unshifted, i.e. classical, lognormal distribution Λµ˜,σ˜2 to Λµ,σ2,λ, it
becomes clear that this distribution yields firm values lower or equal to d1 with a strictly
positive probability, because d1 > 0.
Thus, if d1 = d2 and if exogenous assets are lognormally distributed, the lognormal
model overestimates the actual risk of a firm under cross-ownership of debt if the cross-
ownership fractions converge to 1.
Recall that we had d1 = d2 also in our simulations. In Section 3.2 we saw that under
cross-ownership of debt, the actual risk was overestimated already for cross-ownership
fractions equal to 0.95.
4.2.2. d1 < d2
If d1 < d2, it follows from (32) and Lemma A4 in the Appendix that
V d
∗
1 = (A1 + d2) · 1A∗ss + (A1 + A2 + d1) · 1A∗sd P − a.s.,
i.e. V d
∗
1 > d1 with probability 1 (since P (A
∗
dd∪A∗ds) = 0) and thus P (V d∗1 < d1) = 0. As
in the case of d1 = d2, the lognormal model would yield a probability of default bigger
than 0, so, under cross-ownership of debt only, the lognormal model again overestimates
the actual risk of firm 1, if the corresponding cross-ownership fractions converge to 1.
4.2.3. d1 > d2
For this constellation, the situation is somewhat trickier. Equation (32) and Lemma A4
in the Appendix now yield
V d
∗
1 = A1 + d2 P − a.s.,
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i.e. the firm value of firm 1 again follows a shifted lognormal distribution Λµ,σ2,λ with
shift parameter λ = d2. Interestingly, V1 is independent of d1, as long as this face value
of debt is larger than d2.
Because of d1 > d2, we now have
P (V d
∗
1 < d1) > P (V
d∗
1 < d2) = 0,
i.e. the limiting probability of default of firm 1 is strictly positive. So the argumentation
used in the previous sections cannot be applied to this case.
Let
V˜ d
∗
1 ∼ LN (µ˜, σ˜2), (33)
where µ˜ and σ˜2 are determined such that E(V˜ d
∗
1 ) = E(V
d∗
1 ) = E(A1)+d2 and Var(V˜
d∗
1 ) =
Var(Vd
∗
1 ) = Var(A1).
Straightforward calculations yield
µ˜ =
1
2
ln
(
(E(A1) + d2)
4
Var(A1) + (E(A1) + d2)2
)
>
1
2
ln
(
E(A1)
4
Var(A1) + E(A1)2
)
= µ,
σ˜2 = ln
(
Var(A1)
(E(A1) + d2)2
+ 1
)
< ln
(
Var(A1)
E(A1)2
+ 1
)
= σ2,
where the last inequality follows from d2 > 0.
Then we have the following limiting probabilities of default:
P (V d
∗
1 < d1) = P (A1 < d1 − d2) = Φ
(
ln(d1 − d2)− µ
σ
)
,
P (V˜ d
∗
1 < d1) = Φ
(
ln(d1)− µ˜
σ˜
)
.
Thus, in the limit, the lognormal model overestimates the actual risk if and only if
ln(d1 − d2)− µ
σ
<
ln(d1)− µ˜
σ˜
⇔ σ˜ ln(d1 − d2)− σ ln(d1) < σ˜µ− σµ˜
⇔ (d1 − d2)
σ˜
(d1)σ
< exp(σ˜µ− σµ˜). (34)
Straightforward calculations show that the LHS of (34) as a function of d1 has a maxi-
mum value of (
σ˜
σ−σ˜
d2
)σ˜(
σ
σ−σ˜
d2
)σ =: LHSmax (35)
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Figure 4: Sketch of the LHS of (34) as a function of d1.
taken in d1 =
σ
σ−σ˜
d2 =: d1,max > d2 because of σ > σ˜. Furthermore,
lim
d1ցd2
(d1 − d2)σ˜
(d1)σ
= 0, lim
d1→∞
(d1 − d2)σ˜
(d1)σ
= 0,
which implies that the LHS of (34) is a bell-shaped, continuous function of d1 with
domain (d2,∞) and maximum value LHSmax taken in d1 = d1,max.
Note that the RHS of (34) is independent of d1. It can be shown (cf. Lemma A5 in the
Appendix) that
LHSmax =
(
σ˜
σ−σ˜
d2
)σ˜(
σ
σ−σ˜
d2
)σ > exp(σ˜µ− σµ˜),
independently of the exact values of µ, σ and d2, which means that the maximum value
of the LHS of (34) as a function of d1 is always greater than the constant exp(σ˜µ−σµ˜).
Thus (cf. Figure 4), there are two values d∗1 and d
∗∗
1 , d
∗
1 < d1,max < d
∗∗
1 , such that
(d∗1 − d2)σ˜
(d∗1)
σ
=
(d∗∗1 − d2)σ˜
(d∗∗1 )
σ
= exp(σ˜µ− σµ˜), (36)
i.e. (34) holds if and only if d1 < d
∗
1 or d1 > d
∗∗
1 . In these cases, the lognormal model
overestimates the actual risk, if the cross-ownership fractions of debt converge to 1.
4.2.4. Conclusion for limiting risk under XOS of debt
Our case differentiation with respect to the relative sizes of d1 and d2 can be summarized
as follows.
Proposition 2. Under cross-ownership of debt with lognormally distributed exogenous
asset values, the lognormal model underestimates the actual limiting probability of default
of a firm, i.e.
lim
Md
1,2,M
d
2,1→1
P (V d1 < d1) > P (V˜
d∗
1 < d1),
if and only if
d∗1 < d1 < d
∗∗
1 ,
with d∗1 and d
∗∗
1 given by (36). In particular, the actual limiting default probability is
21
overestimated if d1 ≤ d2.
Recall that under cross-ownership of equity, the lognormal model underestimated the
actual limiting risk for every level of d1 (cf. Proposition 1). So for d1 ≤ d2, Proposition 1
and Proposition 2 are both confirmation and extension to our empirical finding that the
two types of cross-ownership have opposite effects on the probabilities of default.
5. General Probabilities of Default
Having analyzed the probability of default of firm 1 if the respective cross-ownership
fractions converge to 1 in the previous section, we will now examine the probability of
default of a firm if cross-ownership fractions are strictly smaller than 1. For the case
of cross-ownership of debt, the assumption of lognormally distributed exogenous assets
proved to be crucial, whereas the results for the case of cross-ownership of equity also
hold under far less restricting conditions. In the following, we will drop any distributional
assumption with respect to exogenous asset values, we only require their distribution to
be square-integrable and non-degenerate in a certain sense. This will be clarified later.
In particular, we allow asset values to be zero. Furthermore, our results will be valid
for all three types of cross-ownership, we do not need a case differentiation as in Section 4.
We set Add ∪Ads =: Ad. and Ass ∪Asd =: As., i.e. Ad. and As. denote the regions where
firm 1 is in default, or not.
Again, let V1 be the (random) firm value of firm 1. According to the above partition
of R+0 × R+0 , we also consider the distribution of V1 as the weighted average of two
conditional distributions on these areas, namely
P (V1 ≤ q) = P (V1 ≤ q |Ad.)× p+ P (V1 ≤ q |As.)× (1− p), q ≥ 0, (37)
where
p := P ((A1, A2) ∈ Ad.). (38)
In the following, we assume the conditional distributions of V1 on Ad. and As. to be
fixed. Only their mixing parameter p will vary. Of course, the “total” moments of V1
on R+0 × R+0 then depend on p, which is indicated by the corresponding index:
Ep(V1) = E(V1 |Ad.)× p+ E(V1 |As.)× (1− p), (39)
Ep(V
2
1 ) = E(V
2
1 |Ad.)× p+ E(V 21 |As.)× (1− p). (40)
Note that we do not make any specific assumptions with respect to the distribution of
(A1, A2) : Ω→ R+0 × R+0 , we only require this distribution to imply
0 < Varp(V1) <∞ ∀ p ∈ [0, 1]. (41)
A sufficient condition for (41) to be met is that both conditional variances Var(V1 |As.)
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and Var(V1 |Ad.) are strictly positive3.
Because of V1 ≥ 0, (41) also implies that Ep(V1) and Ep(V 21 ) are strictly positive for all
p ∈ [0, 1].
Let us now consider the probabilities of default obtained from Suzuki’s model and the
lognormal model.
5.1. Suzuki’s model
Under Suzuki’s model we simply have
P (V1 < d1) = P ((A1, A2) ∈ Ad.) = p
by (17) and (38).
5.2. Lognormal model
For any p ∈ [0, 1], letWp be lognormally distributed with E(Wp) = Ep(V1) and Var(Wp) =
Varp(V1) = Ep(V
2
1 )−Ep(V1)2, i.e.
Wp ∼ LN (µ˜p, σ˜2p)
with
µ˜p := ln
(
E(Wp)
2
√
1
Var(Wp) + E(Wp)2
)
= ln
(
Ep(V1)
2
√
1
Ep(V 21 )
)
=
1
2
ln
(
Ep(V1)
4
Ep(V
2
1 )
)
, (42)
σ˜2p := ln
(
Var(Wp)
E(Wp)2
+ 1
)
= ln
(
Ep(V
2
1 )
Ep(V1)2
)
> 0. (43)
Note that σ˜2p is strictly positive for all p ∈ [0, 1] because of E(Wp) > 0 and (41).
3 This follows from
Varp(V1) = pVar(V1 |As.) + (1− p)Var(V1 |Ad.) + p(1− p)[E(V1 |As.)− E(V1 |Ad.)]2
≥ pVar(V1 |As.) + (1− p)Var(V1 |Ad.).
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Under the lognormal model we then have
P (firm 1 in default) = P (Wp < d1)
= Φ
(
ln(d1)− µ˜p
σ˜p
)
= Φ
 ln(d1)− 12 ln
(
Ep(V1)4
Ep(V 21 )
)
ln
(
Ep(V 21 )
Ep(V1)2
)0.5
 . (44)
Setting
E(V1 |Ad.)− E(V1 |As.) =: x1 < 0 (45)
E(V1 |As.) =: x2 ≥ d1 (46)
E(V 21 |Ad.)−E(V 21 |As.) =: y1 < 0 (47)
E(V 21 |As.) =: y2 ≥ d21, (48)
it follows from (39), (40) and (44) that
P (Wp < d1) = Φ
 ln(d1)− 12 ln
(
(p×x1+x2)4
p×y1+y2
)
ln
(
p×y1+y2
(p×x1+x2)2
)0.5
 .
Thus, the lognormal model underestimates the probability of default if and only if
h(p) := Φ
 ln(d1)− 12 ln
(
(p×x1+x2)4
p×y1+y2
)
ln
(
p×y1+y2
(p×x1+x2)2
)0.5
 < p. (49)
Since the denominator in (49) equals σ˜p > 0 (cf. (43)), h is always defined. Recall that
x1, x2, y1 and y2 do not vary with p.
5.3. Comparison
5.3.1. Values of p close to or identical to 0 and 1
Let us consider (49). If p = 0, which means that firm 1 is in default with probability
0 in Suzuki’s model, we obtain for the lognormal model that h(0) > 0, because the
standard normal distribution function takes values in (0, 1) only. Since h : [0, 1]→ (0, 1)
is continuous in p, we know that there is a whole region [0, ǫ), ǫ > 0, with
h(p) > p, p ∈ [0, ǫ), (50)
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where ǫ depends on x1, x2, y1 and y2. This can be interpreted as follows: If, for given
x1, x2, y1 and y2, the actual probability of default for firm 1 is very small (i.e. smaller
than ǫ(x1, x2, y1, y2)), the lognormal model will overestimate this probability of default
in this setup.
Recall that in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, we observed a somewhat similar effect. There,
cross-ownership fractions converged to 1, which resulted in an actual limiting default
probability of 0, whereas the lognormal model yielded a strictly positive limiting prob-
ability of default. For continuity reasons, there is a whole range of cross-ownership
fractions such that the actual risk is overestimated. Hence, under cross-ownership of
debt only (with d1 ≤ d2), there are (at least) two ways of constructing scenarios leading
to an overestimation of the actual default probability: first, as done in Sections 4.2.1
and 4.2.2, we can alter the cross-ownership structure between the two firms such that
the actual probability of default converges to 0, and second, we can transform the dis-
tribution of exogenous assets such that the actual probability of default converges to 0,
as done in this section. In both approaches, the lognormal model yields a probability
of default strictly greater than 0. Note that the results of Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 hold
without the assumption of exogenous assets following a lognormal distribution (cf. (24)).
Returning to (49), we obtain for p = 1 that h(1) < 1, i.e. there is an ǫ′(x1, x2, y1, y2) =:
ǫ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that
h(p) < p, p ∈ (ǫ′, 1]. (51)
In this case, the lognormal model underestimates the probability of default.
By Proposition 1, we see that under cross-ownership of equity only, underestimation
of default probabilities can also be constructed by either a structural approach (i.e.
letting cross-ownership fractions converge to 1) or a distributional approach (weighting
the distribution of exogenous assets such that the actual probability of default converges
to 1).
Remark 4. The only assumption we made about the distribution of exogenous assets
was that it implies Varp(V1) > 0 for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Apart from this weak requirement,
the above result is independent of the exact distribution of (A1, A2) on R
+
0 ×R+0 , in the
sense that for any distribution µ on R+0 × R+0 fulfilling (41), we can define a measure
Pp,µ via
Pp,µ(A) := p
µ(A ∩ Ad.)
µ(Ad.)
+ (1− p) µ(A ∩As.)
µ(As.)
, p ∈ [0, 1], A ∈ R+0 × R+0 , (52)
and assume exogenous assets to be distributed according to Pp,µ. If p is chosen such
that p < ǫ = ǫ(µ) or p > ǫ′ = ǫ′(µ), (50) or (51), respectively, follow.
Let us now consider p ∈ (0, 1).
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5.3.2. d1 ≥ Ep(V1)2/Ep(V 21 )0.5
For a given p ∈ (0, 1), let
d1 ≥ Ep(V1)
2
Ep(V 21 )
0.5
. (53)
Because of Jensen’s inequality we have
Ep(V1)
2
Ep(V 21 )
0.5
= Ep(V1)
Ep(V1)
Ep(V 21 )
0.5︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
≤ Ep(V1) ∀ p ∈ (0, 1), (54)
so (53) is met if for example
Ep(V1) ≤ d1. (55)
In Section 5.3.4, we will see how such a V1 can be constructed.
Under assumption (53) we have
d21Ep(V
2
1 ) ≥ Ep(V1)4,
which means that the numerator of (44) is non-negative. Thus,
Φ

ln(d1)− 12 ln
(
Ep(V1)4
Ep(V 21 )
)
ln
(
Ep(V 21 )
Ep(V1)2
)0.5
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
 ≥ 0.5,
i.e. the lognormal model yields a probability of default of at least 0.5 independently of
the value of p, as long as (53) is met.
However, the initial assumption of d1 ≥ E(V1)2/E(V 21 )0.5 does not impose any restric-
tions on p, i.e. under the actual model, every probability of default can be obtained by
choosing suitable conditional distributions of V1 on Ad. and As., respectively. This can
be seen as follows.
Recall that
Ep(V1) = p E(V1 |Ad.)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<d1
+(1− p) E(V1 |As.)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥d1
,
which means that for any conditional distribution of V1 on Ad., we only have to choose
P (V1 ≤ · |As.) such that E(V1 |As.) becomes small enough (i.e. close enough to d1) to
fulfill (55). This can always be achieved by putting enough mass on values close to d1,
which will be shown in Section 5.3.4. Thus, the initial condition d1 ≥ Ep(V1)2/Ep(V 21 )0.5
can be met for any p ∈ (0, 1), if the distribution of (A1, A2) on R+0 ×R+0 is chosen suitably.
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Hence, the probability of default p in the Suzuki model can be arbitrarily small, whereas
the probability of default in the lognormal model is at least 0.5, assuming that d1 ≥
Ep(V1)
2/Ep(V
2
1 )
0.5. In this case, the actual risk is grossly overestimated.
However, if p > 0.5, the actual risk might be underestimated.
5.3.3. d1 ≤ Ep(V1)2/Ep(V 21 )0.5
Let now
d1 ≤ Ep(V1)
2
Ep(V
2
1 )
0.5
(56)
for a given p ∈ (0, 1). Then we have
d21Ep(V
2
1 ) ≤ Ep(V1)4,
which means that the numerator of (44) is non-positive. Thus,
Φ

ln(d1)− 12 ln
(
Ep(V1)4
Ep(V 21 )
)
ln
(
Ep(V 21 )
Ep(V1)2
)0.5
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
 ≤ 0.5.
In contrast to that, the probability of default p obtained from Suzuki’s model can also
take values larger than 0.5. We show that for any p ∈ (0, 1) it is possible that (56) is
fulfilled. By (54), a necessary condition for (56) is Ep(V1) > d1.
For some E > d1, let the distribution of (A1, A2) on R
+
0 × R+0 be such that
V1 =
{
0.5 d1, with probability p,
E−0.5 p d1
1−p
, with probability 1− p, (57)
that is there are only two firm values possible. In Section 5.3.4 we will see that there
really is a distribution of (A1, A2) on the positive quadrant that yields a distribution of
V1 as in (57).
Obviously, V1 ≥ 0 because of E > d1, and Ep(V1) = E, so the necessary condition for
(56) is met. Due to E−0.5 p d1
1−p
> d1, we indeed have P (V1 < d1) = p. Furthermore,
Ep(V
2
1 ) = 0.25 d
2
1 p+
(
E − 0.5 p d1
1− p
)2
(1− p)
= 0.25 d21 p+
0.25 d21 p
2 − d1 pE + E2
1− p =
0.25 d21 p− d1 pE + E2
1− p
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and thus
Ep(V1)
2
Ep(V
2
1 )
0.5
≥ d1 ⇔ Ep(V1)
4
Ep(V
2
1 )
≥ d21
⇔ E4(1− p) ≥ 0.25 d41p− d31 pE + E2d21
⇔ E4(1− p) + d31 pE − E2d21 − 0.25 d41p ≥ 0.
For given p, the inequality is always met if E is chosen large enough.
For p > 0.5 this means that the probability of default is underestimated if we use the
lognormal model instead of Suzuki’s model.
5.3.4. Feasibility of required distributions of V1
In the previous sections, we saw that the lognormal model yields only a limited range of
probabilities of default if the (conditional) distributions of V1 are chosen suitably. Since
the distribution of V1 is a transformation of the distribution of exogenous assets, we have
to make sure that it is in fact possible to choose the distribution of (A1, A2) on R
+
0 ×R+0
such that
1. E(V1 |As.) is near to d1 (Section 5.3.2).
2. for a given p ∈ (0, 1), the distribution of V1 is of the form
V1 =
{
0.5 d1, with probability p,
E−0.5 p d1
1−p
, with probability 1− p,
(Section 5.3.3).
Ad 1: If the conditional distribution of (A1, A2) on As. is such that it has much mass
near the “border” to Ad. (because we have V1 = d1 on this border), the conditional
expectation E(V1 |As.) has the desired property in Section 5.3.2.
Ad 2: Let D := {(a1, a2) : V1(a1, a2) = 0.5 d1} =: DAdd ∪DAds with
DAdd :={(a1, a2) ∈ Add : V1(a1, a2) = 0.5 d1}
={(a1, a2) ∈ Add : (a1 +Md1,2a2) = 0.5(1−Md1,2Md2,1)d1},
DAds :={(a1, a2) ∈ Ads : V1(a1, a2) = 0.5 d1}
={(a1, a2) ∈ Ads : a1 +M s1,2a2 + (Md1,2 −M s1,2)d2 = 0.5(1−M s1,2Md2,1)d1},
where we made use of (15).
Since E has to be chosen sufficiently large so that (56) is met, we can assume without
loss of generality that S := {(a1, a2) : V1(a1, a2) = E−0.5 p d11−p } ⊂ Ass. Then it follows from
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(15) that
S = {(a1, a2) ∈ Ass :
a1 +M
s
1,2a2 +M
s
1,2(M
s
2,1 −Md2,1)d1 + (M s1,2 −Md1,2)d2 = (1−M s1,2M s2,1)E−0.5 p d11−p },
i.e. S is a straight line in Ass.
In order to obtain the desired distribution of V1, we thus only have to ensure that
P ((A1, A2) ∈ D) = p
P ((A1, A2) ∈ S) = 1− p
P ((A1, A2) ∈ R+0 × R+0 \(D ∪ S)) = 0,
which can be constructed easily.
5.4. Conclusion for the general case
The above analysis shows that we cannot arrive at definite conclusions as to whether the
lognormal model over- or underestimates the actual probability of default of a firm in the
general case. Although (49) provides an exact formula, we cannot solve this inequality
for p or the conditional moments of V1 to gain further insight.
However, if p = 0 or p = 1, risk is systematically over- and underestimated, respectively.
Further, for given conditional distributions of V1 on As. and Ad., there is a whole interval
I1 := [0, ǫ) and hence a whole family of distributions Pp (p ∈ I1) of V1 (cf. (37) and
Remark 4) such that the approximating lognormal model leads to an overestimation
of the actual probability of default p. Similarly, there is an interval I2 := (ǫ
′, 1] with
corresponding distributions of V1 such that the approximating lognormal model leads to
an underestimation of the actual probability of default p ∈ I2.
If the expected firm value is smaller than the face value of debt, the lognormal model
yields a probability of default of at least 0.5, independently of the variance of the firm
value. If the variance is small, the actual probability of default can be much smaller.
On the other hand, there are also situations where the lognormal model grossly under-
estimates the actual risk of default.
6. Summary and Outlook
For the case of two firms possessing a fraction of each other’s of equity and/or debt, our
analysis shows that Suzuki’s method to evaluate these firms is much more appropriate
than the application of Merton’s model to each firm separately. Under cross-ownership,
firm values are in general not lognormally distributed anymore, which is assumed under
Merton’s model. Our simulation study revealed that the two models can yield relatively
different probabilities of default (measured in terms of the relative risk ratio), if the
two firms have established a high level of cross-ownership. The direction of the effect
(i.e. over- or underestimation) depends on the considered type of cross-ownership. A
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theoretical analysis of our empirical findings confirmed that in the limit the lognormal
model can lead to both over- and underestimation of the actual probability of default
of a firm. Furthermore, we provide a formula that allows us to check for an arbitrary
scenario of cross-ownership and any distribution of exogenous assets (on the positive
quadrant) whether the approximating lognormal model will over- or underestimate the
related probability of default of a firm. In particular, any given distribution of exoge-
nous asset values on the positive quadrant (non-degenerate in a certain sense) can be
transformed into a new, “extreme” distribution of exogenous assets yielding such a high
or low actual probability of default that the approximating lognormal model will under-
and overestimate this risk, respectively.
Future research could aim at extending this analysis to the joint probability of default of
the two firms. Furthermore, one could consider the discrepancy between the univariate
distribution functions of V1 under Suzuki’s model and the lognormal model in depen-
dency of the model parameters, for example the realized type and level of cross-ownership
and the face values of liabilities. For that, we are planning a further simulation study.
In a next step, it would be interesting to examine the bivariate distribution of V1 and V2
and the resulting dependency structure. In a short, at present unpublished analysis, we
already gained a first impression which leads us to the conjecture that this dependency
structure cannot be captured by the lognormal model, see Figure 5 for an example.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: Scatterplot of bivariate firm values (V1, V2) (XOS of debt only), stratified by
Suzuki areas Add (black), Ads (darkgrey), Asd (grey) and Ass (lightgrey); σ
2 =
1, d1 = 11.3, M
d
1,2 = M
d
2,1 = 0.95, n = 100, 000; (a) firm values resulting from
Suzuki’s model (b) firm values resulting from matched lognormal distribution.
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Appendix: Some technical results
Lemma A1. Let V s1 be given by (19) in Section 2.2.3, let (A1, A2) follow a lognormal
distribution as given in (24) and let µ˜ and σ˜ be defined as in (27) and (28) in Section
4.1, respectively. Then
lim
Ms
1,2,M
s
2,1→1
σ˜ <∞ and µ˜→∞ for M s1,2,M s2,1 → 1.
Proof. From
V s1
∣∣
Ass
=
1
1−M s1,2M s2,1
(A1 +M
s
1,2A2 −M s1,2(M s2,1d1 + d2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by (5)
), (58)
we obtain
E(V s1 · 1Ass) =
1
1−M s1,2M s2,1
E([A1 +M
s
1,2A2 −M s1,2(M s2,1d1 + d2)] · 1Ass), (59)
Var(Vs1 · 1Ass) =
(
1
1−M s1,2M s2,1
)2
Var([A1 +M
s
1,2A2] · 1Ass)
=
(
1
1−M s1,2M s2,1
)2 (
E([A1 +M
s
1,2A2]
2 · 1Ass)− E([A1 +M s1,2A2] · 1Ass)2
)
.
(60)
Let 1A∗ss denote the limit of 1Ass if M
s
1,2,M
s
2,1 → 1. For its existence, see Lemma A2. In
particular, 1A∗ss ≥ 1Ass for all M s1,2,M s2,1 ∈ (0, 1). Because of
[A1 +M
s
1,2A2 −M s1,2(M s2,1d1 + d2)] · 1Ass ≤ [A1 +M s1,2A2] · 1Ass ≤ [A1 + A2] · 1A∗ss,
[A1 +M
s
1,2A2]
2 · 1Ass ≤ (A1 + A2)2 · 1A∗ss for all M s1,2,M s2,1 ∈ (0, 1),
the Dominated Convergence Theorem implies that if M s1,2,M
s
2,1 → 1,
E([A1 +M
s
1,2A2 −M s1,2(M s2,1d1 + d2)] · 1Ass)→ E([A1 + A2 − d1 − d2] · 1A∗ss) <∞,
(61)
E([A1 +M
s
1,2A2] · 1Ass)→ E([A1 + A2] · 1A∗ss) <∞, (62)
E([A1 +M
s
1,2A2]
2 · 1Ass)→ E([A1 + A2]2 · 1A∗ss) <∞, (63)
i.e. Var([A1+M
s
1,2A2] · 1Ass)→ Var([A1+A2] · 1A∗ss) for M s1,2,M s2,1 → 1. Note that both,
E([A1 + A2 − d1 − d2] · 1A∗ss) and Var([A1 + A2] · 1A∗ss), are strictly positive due to the
lognormal distribution of (A1, A2) and the fact that A
∗
ss = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 + a2 ≥
d1 + d2} 6= ∅ (cf. Lemma A2). We obtain from (59)–(63) that
E(V s1 · 1Ass),Var(Vs1 · 1Ass)→∞, M s1,2,M s2,1 → 1,
33
and
Var(Vs1 · 1Ass)
E(V s1 · 1Ass)
=
1
1−M s1,2M s2,1
Var([A1 +A2] · 1A∗ss)
E([A1 + A2 − d1 − d2] · 1A∗ss)
→∞, (64)
Var(Vs1 · 1Ass)
E(V s1 · 1Ass)2
→ Var([A1 +A2] · 1A∗ss)
E([A1 + A2 − d1 − d2] · 1A∗ss)2
<∞, M s1,2,M s2,1 → 1. (65)
Then we have for the expectation and variance of V s1 on R
+
0 × R+0 that
E(V s1 ) = E(V
s
1 · 1Ass) + E(V s1 · 1Acss)→∞ for M s1,2,M s2,1 → 1, (66)
and
Var(Vs1) =Var(V
s
1 · 1Ass) + Var(Vs1 · 1Acss)− 2E(Vs1 · 1Ass)E(Vs1 · 1Acss), (67)
where limMs
1,2,M
s
2,1→1
E(V s1 · 1Acss) < ∞ and limMs1,2,Ms2,1→1Var(Vs1 · 1Acss) < ∞, since
straightforward calculations show that V s1 · 1Acss < d1 + 1Ms
2,1
d2. Thus, (64) and (67)
imply
Var(Vs1) → ∞, M s1,2,M s2,1 → 1, (68)
and
Var(Vs1)
E(V s1 )
2
∼
4Var(V
s
1 · 1Ass)
E(V s1 · 1Ass)2
, M s1,2,M
s
2,1 → 1, (69)
because all the other terms in (66) and (67) are dominated by the expressions in (69),
which go to infinity. Hence, by (65),
Var(Vs1)
E(V s1 )
2
→ Var([A1 +A2] · 1A∗ss)
E([A1 + A2 − d1 − d2] · 1A∗ss)2
<∞, M s1,2,M s2,1 → 1. (70)
Altogether, by (66) and (70),
lim
Ms
1,2,M
s
2,1→1
σ˜ = ln
(
lim
Ms
1,2,M
s
2,1→1
Var(Vs1)
E(V s1 )
2
+ 1
)0.5
<∞
and
µ˜ = −1
2
ln
Var(Vs1)E(V s1 )4 + E(V s1 )−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0
→∞ for M s1,2,M s2,1 → 1.
4For functions f and g, f(x) ∼ g(x), x→ x0, ⇔ limx→x0 f(x)g(x) = 1.
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Lemma A2. Let Ass be defined as in (5). Under cross-ownership of equity only, the
pointwise limit of 1Ass for M
s
1,2,M
s
2,1 → 1 exists and is given by 1A∗ss with
A∗ss := {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 + a2 ≥ d1 + d2}. (71)
Proof. Under cross-ownership of equity only, the formula of Ass reduces to
{(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 +M s1,2a2 ≥ d1 +M s1,2d2, M s2,1a1 + a2 ≥M s2,1d1 + d2}. (72)
Let (M s1,2,n1)n1∈N and (M
s
2,1,n2
)n2∈N be arbitrary, but strictly increasing sequences in (0, 1)
with limit 1, and let Ass,n1,n2 stand for Ass associated with the n1th and n2th element
the above sequences. Then it is easy to see from (72) that Ass,n1,n2 ⊂ Ass,n1+1,n2 , i.e.
Ass,n1,n2 is strictly increasing in n1. Similarly, Ass,n1,n2 is strictly increasing in n2. Hence,
the indicator function of Ass,n1,n2 is pointwise strictly increasing in n1 and n2, and its
pointwise limit exists and is a function with values in {0, 1} only. As such, this limit is
of the form 1A for some set A ⊆ R+0 × R+0 .
In order to show A = A∗ss, we first assume 1A(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) = 1, i.e. there is an N ∈ N such
that (a∗1, a
∗
2) ∈ Ass,n1,n2 for all n1, n2 ≥ N , i.e.
a∗1 +M
s
1,2,n1
a∗2 ≥ d1 +M s1,2,n1d2 for all n1 ≥ N,
M s2,1,n2a
∗
1 + a
∗
2 ≥M s2,1,n2d1 + d2 for all n2 ≥ N.
In the limit of n1, n2 →∞, this means that a∗1 + a∗2 ≥ d1 + d2, i.e. A ⊆ A∗ss.
Let now 1A(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) = 0, i.e. for all n1, n2 ∈ N,
a∗1 +M
s
1,2,n1a
∗
2 < d1 +M
s
1,2,n1d2, (73)
M s2,1,n2a
∗
1 + a
∗
2 < M
s
2,1,n2d1 + d2. (74)
In the limit of n1, n2 →∞, we obtain from (73) and (74) that a∗1 + a∗2 ≤ d1 + d2. If we
had a∗1 + a
∗
2 = d1 + d2, (73) and (74) would imply a
∗
2 > d2 and a
∗
1 > d1, in contradiction
to a∗1 + a
∗
2 = d1 + d2. Hence, a
∗
1 + a
∗
2 < d1 + d2, i.e. (a
∗
1, a
∗
2) 6∈ A∗ss, and the assertion
follows.
Lemma A3. Let Ass, Asd, Ads and Add be given by (5)–(8). Under cross-ownership of
debt only, the pointwise limits of their indicator functions 1Ass, 1Asd, 1Ads and 1Add exist
for Md1,2,M
d
2,1 → 1.
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Proof. Under cross-ownership of debt only, we have
Ass = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 ≥ d1 −Md1,2d2, a2 ≥ d2 −Md2,1d1}, (75)
Asd = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 +Md1,2a2 ≥ (1−Md1,2Md2,1)d1, a2 < d2 −Md2,1d1}, (76)
Ads = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 < d1 −Md1,2d2, Md2,1a1 + a2 ≥ (1−Md1,2Md2,1)d2}, (77)
Add = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 +Md1,2a2 < (1−Md1,2Md2,1)d1, Md2,1a1 + a2 < (1−Md1,2Md2,1)d2}.
(78)
Let (Md1,2,n1)n1∈N and (M
d
2,1,n2)n2∈N be arbitrary, but strictly increasing sequences in (0, 1)
with limit 1, and let Ass,n1,n2 , Asd,n1,n2, Ads,n1,n2 and Add,n1,n2 stand for the Suzuki areas
associated with the n1th and n2th element the above sequences.
First, it is easy to see from (75) that Ass,n1,n2 ⊂ Ass,n1+1,n2 , i.e. Ass,n1,n2 is strictly
increasing in n1. Similarly, Ass,n1,n2 is strictly increasing in n2. Hence, also the se-
quence of indicator functions 1Ass,n1,n2 is pointwise strictly increasing in n1 and n2, i.e.
limn1,n2→∞ 1Ass,n1,n2 exists.
Next,
Asd,n1,n2 = {a1 +Md1,2,n1a2 ≥ (1−Md1,2,n1Md2,1,n2)d1, }︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Asd,n1,n2,1
∩{a2 < d2 −Md2,1,n2d1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Asd,n2,2
, (79)
where Asd,n1,n2,1 increases in both n1 and n2 and Asd,n2,2 decreases in n2. Hence, the
limits of the associated (separate) indicator functions exist, and because of 1Asd,n1,n2 =
1Asd,n1,n2,1 × 1Asd,n2,2 for all n1, n2 ∈ N by (79), the limit of 1Asd,n1,n2 exists as well.
Analogously we can write
Ads,n1,n2 = {a1 < d1 −Md1,2,n1d2}︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Ads,n1,1
∩{Md2,1,n2a1 + a2 ≥ (1−Md1,2,n1Md2,1,n1,n2)d2}︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Ads,n1,n2,2
, (80)
with Ads,n1,1 decreasing in n1 and Ads,n1,n2,2 increasing in both n1 and n2. Hence, the
limits of the related indicator functions exist, and thus also the limit of 1Ads,n1,n2 , if n1, n2
converge to infinity.
With regard to Add,n1,n2 , we can argue similarly to Ass,n1,n2 . Add,n1,n2 is strictly decreasing
in n1 and n2, i.e. the limit of the associated indicator function for n1, n2 →∞ exists.
Lemma A4. Let d1, d2 > 0. With A
∗
ss, A
∗
sd, A
∗
ds and A
∗
dd as defined in (31), we have
A∗dd = {(0, 0)} for all d1, d2 > 0, (81)
A∗sd = ∅ ⇔ d2 < d1, (82)
A∗ds = ∅ ⇔ d1 < d2. (83)
If d1 = d2, A
∗
sd and A
∗
ds equal the strictly positive a1-axis and a2-axis, respectively.
Proof. Let (Md1,2,n1)n1∈N, (M
d
2,1,n2
)n2∈N, Ass,n1,n2 , Asd,n1,n2 , Ads,n1,n2 and Add,n1,n2 be de-
fined as in the proof of Lemma A3.
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Since (0, 0) ∈ Add,n1,n2 for all n1, n2 ∈ N, i.e. 1Add,n1,n2 (0, 0) = 1 for all n1, n2 ∈ N, we also
have limn1,n2→∞ 1Add,n1,n2 (0, 0) = 1, i.e. (0, 0) ∈ A∗dd. Let us now assume (a∗1, a∗2) ∈ A∗dd
with a∗1 + a
∗
2 > 0, w.l.o.g. let a
∗
1 > 0. Since Add,n1,n2 is strictly decreasing in n1, n2 (cf.
(78)), we have for all n1, n2 ∈ N,
a∗1 +M
d
1,2,n1
a∗2 < (1−Md1,2,n1Md2,1,n2)d1, (84)
and as the RHS of (84) converges to 0 if n1 and n2 go to infinity, (81) follows.
Let us now assume d2 < d1 and (a
∗
1, a
∗
2) ∈ A∗sd. Then, by (79),
a∗2 < d2 −Md2,1,n2d1 for all n2 ∈ N. (85)
Since the limit of the RHS of (85) for n2 → ∞ is negative, such an (a∗1, a∗2) ≥ 0 does
not exist. If d2 ≥ d1, it is straightforward to see that A∗sd = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 +
a2 > 0, a2 ≤ d2 − d1}, and (82) follows. In particular, we have for d1 = d2 that
A∗sd = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 > 0, a2 = 0}. Analogously, one can show (83) with the help of
(80), and we obtain for d1 ≥ d1 that A∗ds = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 + a2 > 0, a1 ≤ d1 − d2},
and A∗ds = {(a1, a2) ≥ 0 : a1 = 0, a2 > 0} if d1 = d2.
Lemma A5. Let µ, µ˜ ∈ R, σ, σ˜, d2 ∈ R+, σ > σ˜, be such that
exp(µ˜+ 0.5σ˜2) = exp(µ+ 0.5σ2) + d2, (86)
(exp(σ˜2)− 1) exp(2µ˜+ σ˜2) = (exp(σ2)− 1) exp(2µ+ σ2), (87)
which exactly corresponds to the definition of µ˜ and σ˜ in (33) in Section 4.2.3. Then
exp(σ˜µ− σµ˜) <
(
σ˜
σ−σ˜
d2
)σ˜(
σ
σ−σ˜
d2
)σ . (88)
Proof. First, (86) and (87) imply that
µ˜ = µ+ 0.5σ2 − 0.5σ˜2 + ln
(√
exp(σ2)− 1√
exp(σ˜2)− 1
)
,
ln(d2) = µ+ 0.5σ
2 + ln
(√
exp(σ2)− 1√
exp(σ˜2)− 1 − 1
)
.
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Hence,
(88)⇔ 0 > σ˜µ− µ˜σ + (σ − σ˜) ln(d2)− (σ − σ˜) ln(σ − σ˜)− σ˜ ln(σ˜) + σ ln(σ)
⇔ 0 > − σ ln
(√
exp(σ2)− 1√
exp(σ˜2)− 1
)
+ 0.5σ˜2σ − 0.5σ˜σ2 − σ˜ ln(σ˜) + σ ln(σ)
+ (σ − σ˜) ln
(√
exp(σ2)− 1√
exp(σ˜2)− 1 − 1
)
− (σ − σ˜) ln(σ − σ˜)
⇔ 0 > (σ − σ˜)
[
ln
(√
exp(σ2)− 1√
exp(σ˜2)− 1 − 1
)
− ln(σ − σ˜)− 0.5σσ˜
]
− σ˜ ln(σ˜) + σ ln
(
σ
√
exp(σ˜2)− 1√
exp(σ2)− 1
)
.
Due to σ > σ˜, it is sufficient for (88) to show
(σ − σ˜)
[
ln
(√
exp(σ2)− 1√
exp(σ˜2)− 1 − 1
)
− ln(σ − σ˜)
]
− σ˜ ln(σ˜) + σ ln
(
σ
√
exp(σ˜2)− 1√
exp(σ2)− 1
)
< 0
or equivalently
(σ − σ˜) ln
(√
exp(σ2)− 1−√exp(σ˜2)− 1
σ − σ˜
)
− σ ln
(√
exp(σ2)− 1
σ
)
< −σ˜ ln
(√
exp(σ˜2)− 1
σ˜
)
.
(89)
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For that, we consider the derivative of the LHS of (89) with respect to σ:
∂
∂σ
[
(σ − σ˜) ln
(√
exp(σ2)− 1−√exp(σ˜2)− 1
σ − σ˜
)
− σ ln
(√
exp(σ2)− 1
σ
)]
= ln
(√
exp(σ2)− 1−√exp(σ˜2)− 1
σ − σ˜
)
+
(σ − σ˜)2
[
exp(σ2)σ√
exp(σ2)−1
(σ − σ˜)−
(√
exp(σ2)− 1−√exp(σ˜2)− 1)](√
exp(σ2)− 1−√exp(σ˜2)− 1) (σ − σ˜)2
− ln
(√
exp(σ2)− 1
σ
)
−
σ2
[
exp(σ2)σ√
exp(σ2)−1
−√exp(σ2)− 1]√
exp(σ2)− 1 σ2
= ln
(
σ√
exp(σ2)− 1
)
− ln
(
σ − σ˜√
exp(σ2)− 1−√exp(σ˜2)− 1
)
+
exp(σ2)σ√
exp(σ2)− 1
[
σ − σ˜√
exp(σ2)− 1−√exp(σ˜2)− 1 − σ√exp(σ2)− 1
]
.
Because of σ−σ˜√
exp(σ2)−1−
√
exp(σ˜2)−1
− σ√
exp(σ2)−1
< 0, this derivative is negative if and only
if
ln
(
σ√
exp(σ2)−1
)
− ln
(
σ−σ˜√
exp(σ2)−1−
√
exp(σ˜2)−1
)
σ√
exp(σ2)−1
− σ−σ˜√
exp(σ2)−1−
√
exp(σ˜2)−1
<
exp(σ2)σ√
exp(σ2)− 1 . (90)
Since the LHS of (90) can be interpreted as the difference quotient of the concave
logarithmic function in x0 =
σ√
exp(σ2)−1
and x = σ−σ˜√
exp(σ2)−1−
√
exp(σ˜2)−1
, the LHS of (90)
is strictly decreasing in x and thus strictly increasing in σ˜. From
lim
σ˜րσ
σ − σ˜√
exp(σ2)− 1−√exp(σ˜2)− 1 =
(
lim
σ˜րσ
√
exp(σ2)− 1−√exp(σ˜2)− 1
σ − σ˜
)−1
=
(
∂
∂σ
√
exp(σ2)− 1
)−1
=
√
exp(σ2)− 1
exp(σ2)σ
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it follows that the LHS of (90) is smaller than
ln
(
σ√
exp(σ2)−1
)
− ln
(√
exp(σ2)−1
exp(σ2)σ
)
σ√
exp(σ2)−1
−
√
exp(σ2)−1
exp(σ2)σ
<
exp(σ2)σ√
exp(σ2)− 1 ,
where the last inequality follows from straightforward calculations and the fact that
ln(x) < x − 1 ∀ x > 0. Thus, (90) is met for all σ˜ < σ, i.e. the LHS of (89) is strictly
decreasing in σ for all σ˜ > 0. Hence, for (89) it only remains to show that (89) holds in
the limit of σ ց σ˜. Because of∣∣∣∣∣ limσցσ˜
√
exp(σ2)− 1−√exp(σ˜2)− 1
σ − σ˜
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂σ˜√exp(σ˜2)− 1
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ exp(σ˜2)σ˜√exp(σ˜2)− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ <∞,
we have
lim
σցσ˜
[
(σ − σ˜) ln
(√
exp(σ2)− 1−√exp(σ˜2)− 1
σ − σ˜
)
− σ ln
(√
exp(σ2)− 1
σ
)]
= −σ˜ ln
(√
exp(σ˜2)− 1
σ˜
)
,
i.e. (89) and (88) follow.
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